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Among science’s many joys is the devilish joy of contrarianism. It’s a special treat to read a 
book that goes against conventional wisdom and that reinterprets past work in light of a new theory. 
Robert Weisberg’s hefty, heterodox Creativity is a major work for the psychology of creativity. 
Weisberg’s book appears in the same year as another textbook on creativity, Sawyer’s (2006) 
Explaining Creativity. These books are naturally compared: they integrate a vast body of thought, 
show a level of scholarship that surpasses the typical textbook, and adopt contrary perspectives on the 
nature of creativity. Sawyer presents a grand integration rooted in sociocultural “confluence models” 
of creativity, concluding that cognitive and intrapersonal approaches never fulfilled their promise. 
Weisberg, in contrast, presents a grand integration rooted in cognitive psychology, concluding that 
confluence models misunderstand how people think creatively. The rift between these books reflects 
two cultures in the psychology of creativity: the psychology of eminent “Big C” creativity, and the 
psychology of everyday “little c” creativity. 
When is Something Creative? 
The typical treatment of creativity proposes that creative products are not merely novel. To be 
creative, something must also be useful, valued, or appropriate. Sawyer (2006), like most creativity 
researchers, advocates for the original-plus-appropriate position. Creativity models insist on an 
appropriateness criterion so they can discriminate between the innovative and the derivative, the 
groundbreaking and the retreading. Consider the difference between John Ashbery’s (1975) book of 
poems Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror, which won the triple crown of literary prizes (the Pulitzer 
Prize, the National Book Award, and the National Book Critics Circle Award), and a chapbook of tired 
love poems written by a disaffected college student. Both are novel, in the sense that neither the 
creator nor anyone else had written identical books of poems before, but only Ashbery’s book is 
valuable and appropriate in relation to contemporary language art. 
Weisberg, in contrast, argues for creativity as intentional novelty. This definition follows from 
Weisberg’s emphasis on creativity as ordinary thinking: creative thought processes are merely ordinary 
thought processes directed toward yielding an original idea. If someone intends to create something 
original, then an original response would be considered creative, even if the response merely 
duplicates the ideas and discoveries of other people. Appropriateness, usefulness, and value are 
immaterial: a creative product is something that is original for the creator, regardless of how useful or 
valued it turns out to be. The cognitive processes that yield original ideas are the conceptual center of 
creativity, not the audience’s responses to the ideas. 
In my view, there is little point in arguing about the merits of these definitions. Both positions 
are internally consistent, and both research traditions follow coherently from their definitions. If you 
believe that creativity is intentional novelty, then you would be taken to studies of everyday creativity, 
such as insight and problem solving. These domains offer incisive experimental methods for 
examining idea generation. But if you believe that creativity is an appropriate and original idea, then 
you would be taken to studies of eminent creativity. Appropriateness, usefulness, and value are 
sociocultural constructs, so requiring an idea to be appropriate entails studying sociocultural factors. 
The psychology of creativity should avoid catching a case of the reallies, to borrow Abelson’s (1995) 
phrase, because arguments over whether something “really is” an instance of something else—Is 
interest really an emotion? Is a dyad really a group? Are merely novel ideas really creative?—are both 
fruitless and ceaseless. 
Psychometric Studies of Creativity 
Weisberg’s ordinary-thinking approach and the sociocultural approach agree on a few things. 
Both approaches, for example, criticize the psychometric approach to creativity, particularly studies of 
divergent thinking. Models of divergent thinking presume that divergent thinking tests (e.g., unusual 
uses tests) assess stable individual differences in the potential for creativity (Runco, 1991) or in the 
ability to generate original ideas (Wilson, Guilford, & Christensen, 1953). The psychometric approach 
to creativity has fallen on hard times. From a sociocultural approach, the study of divergent thinking 
smacks of reductive cognitivism. Sawyer (2006, pp. 44–45) summarily dismisses divergent thinking, 
concluding that divergent thinking tests rarely predict creative accomplishment. 
Weisberg dismisses divergent thinking, too, but for different reasons. He views divergent 
thinking tests as measures of non-ordinary thinking, which conflicts with his view of creativity as 
ordinary, top-down, and goal-directed. After reviewing the Guilford tradition of divergent thinking 
research, he writes “It should be clear from this discussion that the basic perspective outlined by 
Guilford and adopted by those who use tests to measure creative-thinking capacity is that creative 
thinking involves a set of traits that are different from those underlying ordinary thinking” (p. 470). 
Based on a thorough and critical review, Weisberg concludes that divergent thinking is less important 
than ordinary thinking to the psychology of creativity. His antagonism toward divergent thinking 
seems odd: after all, divergent thinking tasks measure ordinary, top-down, goal-driven thought. People 
are given a goal (e.g., to generate unusual uses for a knife), and to do this they must retrieve relevant 
knowledge, identify and generate useful strategies, inhibit obvious responses, and effectively use their 
knowledge and strategies. Research has shown that people respond more creatively when instructed to 
be creative (Runco, Illies, & Eisenman, 2005), which indicates that people can exert some level of 
strategic control over their responses. This sounds goal-directed. 
Furthermore, Weisberg mischaracterizes Plucker’s (1999) reanalysis of Torrance’s longitudinal 
research, a pivotal study in modern divergent thinking research. Using structural equation modeling, 
Plucker conducted a latent-variable analysis of how childhood divergent thinking scores (based on 
3-year averages) predicted adult creative accomplishment. A general divergent thinking factor 
explained 40% of the variance in adult creative accomplishment (standardized β = .61) after 
controlling for intelligence: this is a compelling finding by any standard. Plucker pointed out that 
latent variable analysis is more powerful than conventional correlation and regression methods, and 
that it can model and control for pesky method variance (cf. Silvia, in press). As a result, it offers 
refined and relatively pure estimates of relationships. 
Weisberg, however, describes this study as applying “multiple-regression analysis” (p. 481), 
and he reviews one of Plucker’s exploratory models (i.e., a test of differences between verbal and 
figural fluency scores based on only 1 year of data) instead of Plucker’s central, key finding. 
Furthermore, Weisberg later concludes “Plucker’s methods are not available to rescue the validity of 
the divergent-thinking tests, because the researchers reporting negative findings did use multiple 
regression when they carried out their original analyses” (p. 482). To the contrary, regression analysis 
is a special case (and a less powerful case) of latent-variable analysis (Kline, 2005). Thus, Plucker’s 
study—some of the best evidence for divergent thinking—was misrepresented in Weisberg’s book. 
Most creativity researchers ought to agree with Weisberg that divergent thinking research is weak. 
Even contemporary research will make big claims based on small-sample studies that used only a 
couple measures and applied inadequate statistics. Nevertheless, the best studies offer stronger support, 
and the psychometric study of creativity (like all fields) ought to be judged based on its best research. 
A Third Way? 
Weisberg’s book and Sawyer’s book highlight the differences between the cognitive approach 
and the sociocultural approach, and I suspect that creativity research could drift toward distinct 
subcultures of research. When faced with competing traditions, psychologists would do well to 
remember the work of George Kelly (1955), a creative psychologist according to both Weisberg’s and 
Sawyer’s definitions. He proposed that theories had a range of convenience, the broad swath of human 
behavior that the theory sought to say something about. Within the range, however, the theory had a 
focus of convenience, the narrow region in which the theory is most powerful, detailed, and incisive. 
Many theories share a range of convenience, according to Kelly, but the theories aren’t in competition 
unless they share a focus of convenience. Psychology may thus use different theories pragmatically. 
Weisberg’s approach to creativity and the sociocultural approach to creativity have 
overlapping ranges of convenience: both seek to explain eminent creativity, creativity across diverse 
domains, creativity and mental health, and so forth. Within this range, however, the two approaches 
have different focuses of convenience. Weisberg’s model works best when applied to cognitive 
processes that underlie creativity, such as reasoning, problem solving, analogical transfer, and strategy 
use. The sociocultural model, in contrast, works best when applied to understanding why some 
creators become eminent and how social and cultural factors propel and define creative 
accomplishments. George Kelly would point out that each approach works poorly when applied to the 
other theory’s focus: Weisberg’s approach has little to say about predicting whether a creator will 
become eminent, and the sociocultural approach says little about the inner cognitive processes that 
generate original ideas. The psychology of creativity thus needs both approaches. 
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